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DRUG TESTING OF PRIVATE EMPLOYEES 
Many private employers have begun testing job applicants 
and employees for illegal drug use. This comment considers the 
reliability of the tests used, as well as the issues of privacy raised 
by their use. The author suggests that public policy disfavors the 
use of drug testing in the private public sector because of these 
reliability and privacy concerns. The author concludes with a dis-
cussion of common law causes of action that may be available to 
a private employee subjected to drug testing, including tortious 
invasion of privacy, defamation, and wrongful discharge. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The American workplace has become a battleground for employees 
challenging drug testing programs initiated by employers. It is reported 
that twenty-five to thirty percent of the Fortune 500 companies have 
started to test applicants and current employees for drug use. 1 Several 
Maryland companies have joined in the trend of requiring employee drug 
tests. 2 There are numerous reasons why private employers institute drug 
testing programs. The primary reason is lost productivity caused by sub-
stance abuse at the workplace. Studies indicate that billions of dollars 
are lost each year in American industry as a result of employee drug use. 3 
1. Lacayo, Putting Them All to the Test, TIME, Oct. 21, 1985 at 61 (approximately 
25% of Fortune 500 companies test for drug use); Englade, Who's Hired and Who's 
Fired, STUDENT LAWYER, 20, 22 (April1986), [hereinafter Englade] (about 25% of 
Fortune 500 companies test now, but that figure has gone up 250% in the last three 
years and probably will increase still further); Mandatory Drug Testing: An Invasion 
of Privacy?, TRIAL, Sept. 1986 at 91, [hereinafter Mandatory Drug Testing] (29% 
performed preemployment screening in 1985 and 26% tested employees under cer-
tain conditions); Special Report, Alcohol and Drugs in the Workplace: Costs, Con-
trols, and Controversies (1986), at 27 (BNA) [hereinafter BNA] (a 1985 survey of 180 
Fortune 500 firms found that by 1987, 38% expected to have drug testing 
programs). 
2. Baltimore Sun, March 17, 1986, at SA, col. 2. 
3. Estimates vary widely on the amount of money lost by American industry each year 
because of employee drug use. According to the Employee Assistance Society of 
North America, drug abuse accounts for a loss of 8.3 billion dollars yearly. BNA, 
supra note 1, at 7. Another source notes that more than 33 billion dollars worth of 
productivity was lost because of drug abuse in 1983. BNA, supra note 1, at 8. A 
third source cites studies that indicate that the costs of drug abuse to the U.S. econ-
omy exceeds 26 billion dollars annually. Hartsfield, Medical Examinations as a 
Method of Investigating Employee Wrongdoing, 37 LAB. L.J. 692 (1986) [hereinafter 
Hartsfield] (citing Dealing with Drug Abuse in the Workplace, BUSINESS AND 
HEALTH, (December 1985)). 
Most commentators agree, however, that illegal drug use is not the most preva-
lent problem in the workplace. Lost productivity and accidents because of alcohol 
consumption far outweigh the costs of substance abuse. A National Institute on 
Drug Abuse survey estimated that 100 million people had consumed alcohol within 
the past 30 days, while 30.7 million had used illegal drugs in the same period of 
time. BNA, supra note 1, at 11. Research regarding fatalities and injuries caused by 
impaired employees suggests that alcohol presents the greatest danger at the work-
place. See, e.g., Mandatory Drug Testing, supra note 1, at 91, (citing Mason & 
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Employers also cite rising liability insurance, deteriorating job perform-
ance, increased absenteeism, and loss of quality in products and services 
as justifications for drug testing.4 
Employers utilize drug testing in varying ways. Some require test-
ing of all job applicants. 5 Others use random drug tests to curb sub-
stance abuse among persons already employed. 6 Still other employers 
test only when an employee is suspected of drug use. 7 Drug testing also 
is used after an employee has been involved in an accident in order to 
determine if drugs were a cause of the accident. 8 
Employer responses to positive test results vary from punitive meas-
ures to counselling programs. Twenty-five percent of companies testing 
persons currently employed at the company automatically discharge any 
employee whose urine test indicates drug use.9 Other companies require 
that all employees who test positive for drug use attend rehabilitation 
programs. 10 
This Comment explores the legal ramifications of drug testing of 
McBay, Ethanol, Marijuana, and Other Drugs in 600 Drivers Killed in Single- Vehi-
cle Crashes in North Carolina, 29 J. FORENSIC Sci. 987 (1984)). It also has been 
alleged that prescription drugs are more widely abused than illegal drugs. It is esti-
mated that 70% of all drug related deaths are caused by the abuse of prescription 
drugs. BNA, supra note l, at 71. 
4. See Mandatory Drug Testing, supra note l, at 91 ("worker drug and alcohol abuse 
cost employers $60 billion annually in lost productivity, accidents, higher medical 
claims, increased absenteeism, and theft of company property . . . according to the 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce"); Cohen, Labor Law's New Specialty: Drug Testing, 
AMERICAN LAWYER, June, 1986, at lO (rising rates for liability insurance for em-
ployee accidents have caused some employers to utilize drug testing); Englade, 
supra note 1, at 22 (lost productivity, unnecessary accidents and absenteeism, deteri-
orating job performance, highway accidents, family disruption, and loss of quality in 
products and services are reasons why companies have started to test employees for 
drug use); see also RIA Employment Alert, March 6, 1986 at 4 (additional reasons 
for instituting drug testing include management reaction to drug-related incidents 
or increased drug use in the company, general concern for employee safety, and 
response to governmental regulations). 
5. RIA Employment Alert, supra note 4, at 4 (80% of all drug testing occurs during · 
pre-employment screening of applicants). 
6. See The Nat'l L. J., April 7, 1986, at 22, col. 1 (discussing the legal challenge to the 
Southern Pacific Transportation Company's random drug testing program). 
7. Hartsfield, supra note 3, at 693 (railroad regulations require two supervisory em-
ployees to have "a reasonable suspicion" before an employee can be subjected to a 
drug test); BNA, supra note l, at 110-114, 119-124. 
8. Federal Railroad Administration regulations provide that a urine sample may be 
required after accidents if the railroad reasonably suspects that an employee in-
volved in an accident was impaired or under the influence of drugs at the time of the 
accident. Hartsfield, supra note 3, at 693. 
9. Mandatory Drug Testing, supra note l, at 91. 
10. See RIA Employment Alert, supra note 4, at 4 (57% of companies that perform 
testing strongly encourage or require treatment for substance abuse). Some compa-
nies also provide counselling programs for suspected drug users before any drug 
problem surfaces at the workplace. See BNA, supra note 1, at 81-84, 114-116 (com-
panies such as Northwestern Bell and Adolph Coors Brewing Co. provide counsel-
ling programs fully funded by the company or provide employee assistance 
programs.) 
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employees by private employers. The first section discusses the different 
types of drug tests used by employers and the extent to which these tests 
achieve the employers' objectives in instituting the testing. The Com-
ment then reviews case law that ~as analyzed the reliability of drug tests 
and examines the privacy rights of private sector employees. The Com-
ment concludes with a discussion of three common law causes of action 
that may be available to an employee who has been subjected to a drug 
test. 
II. TYPES OF TESTS USED TO DETECT DRUG USE 
For the purposes of drug testing, virtually all employers, both public 
and private, use urine testing. 11 There are three primary reasons for the 
prevalence of urine testing. First, the residue of drugs remains in an indi-
vidual's excretory system for days or even weeks after the effect of the 
drug has worn off. 12 Second, proponents of drug testing believe that the 
nature of the physical intrusion necessitated by a urine sample is less 
invasive than the intrusion required by a blood test. 13 Last, and perhaps 
most important from the employer's perspective, the most common urine 
tests are relatively inexpensive and can be administered at the employer's 
workplace by persons with no medical experience. 14 
The urinalysis test most widely used by employers is the enzyme 
multiplied immunoassay test, otherwise known as the EMIT test. 15 The 
EMIT test has been the subject of considerable criticism. The Syva Cor-
11. BNA, supra note 1, at 31. Drug use apparently also can be detected by analysis of 
saliva, hair, breath, brainwaves, or blood. Of these various alternatives to urinanal-
ysis, only blood tests are acknowledged as being reliable, convenient ways to detect 
intoxication. /d. 
12. Englade, supra note 1, at 23-24; S.ee also Bishop, Drug Testing Comes to Work, 
CALIFORNIA LAWYER, 29 (April, 1980) (some drugs can stay in the body's system 
for days, even weeks, after use); Comment, Admissibility of Biochemical Urinalysis 
Testing Results for the Purpose of Detecting Marijuana Use, 20 WAKE FOREST L. 
REv. 391, 391 n.8 (1984) [hereinafter Comment, Detecting Marijuana Use] (the 
process of purging the chemical residue of marijuana may range from days to 
weeks); Morgan, Problems of Mass Urine Screening for Misused Drugs, 16(4) J. OF 
PSYCHOACTIVE DRUGS 305, 306 (1984) (hereinafter Morgan) ("(t)he tests that as-
sess the drugs of most current interest (marijuana and cocaine) measure metabolites 
of the drug that persist for hours or days after use."). 
13. BNA, supra note 1, at 32-33 ("A blood test is more intrusive in terms of physical 
effects, but a urine test is more intrusive in terms of what it says about your personal 
life."). 
14. /d. at 31 (blood tests are costly and complicated); Comment, Detecting Marijuana 
Use, supra note 12, at 392 (commonly used urine tests can be purchased in "inex-
pensive field kits that can be transported and used outside of the laboratory environ-
ment"); Englade, supra note 1, at 23 (urine tests are used because they allow for 
testing of many specimens at a reasonable cost without time-consuming sample 
preparation and personnel training); Comment, Your Urine or Your Job: Is Private 
Employee Drug Urinalysis Constitutional in California, 19 LoY. L.A.L. REv. 1452, 
1455-56 (1986) [hereinafter Comment,.Private Employee Urinalysis] (the develop-
ment of an inexpensive, portable test made large scale drug testing convenient). 
15. Comment, Private Employee Urinalysis, supra note 14, at 1455. 
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poration, the manufacturer of the test, claims that the test is ninety-seven 
to ninety-nine percent accurate when properly administered, 16 but a 
study conducted at Northwestern University found that twenty-five per-
cent of the positive test results in employer administered EMIT tests 
were inaccurate. 17 This discrepancy in results may be caused by failure 
to administer the EMIT test properly. Contrary to Syva's recommenda-
tions, employers may fail to use control samples. 18 Control samples, lab-
oratory specimens that have been confirmed as showing positive or 
negative results from drug use, are recommended by Syva to ensure that 
the testing equipment and personnel are performing efficiently. 19 Addi-
tionally, employers frequently disregard Syva's recommendation that a 
laboratory test be conducted to ensure the accuracy of the initial EMIT 
test.20 
The type of urinalysis generally used to confirm results of the EMIT 
test is the gas chromatography/mass spectrometry test (GC/MS).21 
16. /d. at 1456, n.38. 
17. Mandatory Drug Testing, supra note 1, at 91. 
18. See Detecting Marijuana Use, supra note 12, at 398 (recommending that control 
samples be used when testing is done). 
19. /d. 
20. In Peranzo v. Coughin, 608 F. Supp. 1504 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), the court quoted the 
recommendations of the Syva Corporation with regard to confirmation of results: 
Confirmation of Results. Syva recommends confirmation of positive re-
sults. Confirmation of positive results is important in certain environ-
ments. Repeating the test or obtaining verbal corroboration from the 
individual may be adequate confirmation in some situations. If greater 
accuracy is required, Syva recommends that results be confirmed by an 
alternative scientific method. Any of several chromatographic procedures 
may be used for confirmation, the most sensitive and specific of which is 
gas chromatography-mass spectrometry (GC-MS). The procedure used 
should include a hydrolysis step. Procedures without hydrolysis detect 
only the unconjugated form of the major urinary metabolite, whereas the 
EMIT Urine Cannabinoid Assay detects both the conjugated and unconju-
gated forms, as well as additional urinary metabolites. 
/d. at 1514 n.l6. 
Many employers forgo using confirmatory tests because these tests cost $40 to 
$80 each compared to $5 to $10 for an EMIT test. Mandatory Drug Testing, supra 
note l, at 91; see also Detecting Marijuana Use, supra note 12, at 396 n.60 (the cost 
of conducting the test usually used as a confirmation for an EMIT or similar test is 
about $75 whereas the initial test costs only $9). Even government officials fre-
quently disregard the recommendation to conduct a confirmatory test. See Wykoff 
v. Resig, 613 F. Supp. 1504 (N.D. Ind. 1985) (prisoners subjected to disciplinary 
action on the basis of an unconfirmed EMIT test); accord Jensen v. Lick, 589 F. 
Supp. 35 (D.N.D. 1984) (prison officials could impose sanctions based on an uncon-
firmed EMIT test). But see Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F. Supp. 1500 (D. D.C. 1986) 
(school bus attendant's dismissal on the basis of a single unconfirmed EMIT was 
improper); Higgs v. Wilson, 616 F. Supp. 226 (W.D. Ky. 1985) (prison officials need 
to confirm an EMIT result before sanctions may be imposed). 
21. See Englade, supra note 1, at 23 (the GC/MS test is a combination of two types of 
urinalysis- the gas chromatography test and the mass spectrometry test); see also 
Morgan, supra note 12, at 312 ("Many commentators now feel that a positive im-
munoassay screen must be confirmed by gas chromatography plus mass spectrome-
try (GC/MS)"); Peranzo v. Coughlin, 608 F. Supp. 1504, 1514 n.16 (S.D.N.Y. 
556 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 16 
Although the GC/MS test must be performed in a laboratory,22 andre-
quires a greater amount of time to receive results than the EMIT test, it 
is widely acknowledged as being more reliable. 23 The use of this test 
greatly reduces the chance of error in drug testing procedures. 24 None-
theless, there are still problems inherent in urine testing. 
Surveys have found that laboratories specializing in drug testing 
sometimes have large percentages of error.25 The Federal Center of Dis-
ease Control in Atlanta, Georgia, reported that in 1985 there was as 
much as a 66% error in laboratory drug testing. 26 Instrument malfunc-
tion and human error account for much of this inaccuracy. The most 
common problem involves contamination and mislabelling of specimens 
received by a laboratory. For example, the United States Army once 
recalled 52,000 urine samples because of mislabelling and specimen con-
tamination.27 Additionally, "chain of custody" problems arise when 
more than a few samples are tested together.28 
The illegal drug most frequently used in the United States is mari-
juana.29 Consequently, almost all employers are concerned about the use 
1985) (quoting a Syva release that suggests that the GC/MS test be used as a confir-
mation for EMIT tests). 
22. See Comment, Detecting Marijuana Use, supra note 12, at 394-95 (both the gas 
chromatagraphy test and the mass spectrometry test must be performed in 
laboratories). 
23. Englade, supra note 1, at 23; see also McBay, Dubowski, and Finkle, Urine Testing 
for Marijuana Use, 249 J. A.M.A. 881 (1983) [hereinafter Urine Testing](" ... alter-
native test methods ..• should have sensitivity at least equal to the screening test 
method - a condition not generally met at present. Gas chromatography - mass 
spectrometry assays . . . are available and proved accurate and sufficiently 
sensitive."). 
24. Englade, supra note 1, at 23; Urine Testing, supra note 23, at 881. 
25. See Morgan, supra note 12, at 312-316 (citing reports that indicate that drug testing 
laboratories have questionable quality control). In addition to poor quality control, 
laboratories that perform drug testing exclusively are usually unregulated by state 
health officials. Maryland has recently passed a law requiring all laboratories that 
perform drug tests to be licensed by the Department of. Health and Mental Hygiene. 
Baltimore Sun, December 30, 1987, at lB. 
26. Mandatory Drug Testing, supra note 1, at 91. 
27. BNA, supra note 1, at 68. See generally Morgan, supra note 12, at 312-13. 
28. See Comment, Detecting Marijuana Use, supra note 12, at 398 (the degree of chain 
of custody problems is normally a function of the number of specimens taken); see 
a/so H. APPENDIZER, SPORTS AND LAW, 164-67 (1985) (listing chain of custody 
safeguards required when Olympic athletes are tested). 
Courts addressing the question of drug testing by public entities have held that 
the chain of custody of the urine sample must be established if the results of the 
urinalysis are to be used for disciplinary purposes. See Wykoff v. Resig, 613 F. 
Supp. 1504, 1513-14 (N.D. Ind. 1985) (finding that adequate measures were taken 
to insure that plaintiff's urine sample was properly handled and that only author-
ized personnel had access to plaintiff's sample). Private employers using the EMIT 
test and other immunoassays are less able to ensure that such protective measures 
are followed because of the lack of trained personnel performing the tests and the 
uncontrolled environment in which the testing is done. See Englade, supra note I, 
at 23. 
29. A 1982 survey conducted by the National Center on Drug Abuse in Rockville, 
Maryland found that 64% of Americans aged 18-25 said they had used marijuana at 
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of marijuana by employees. However, detection of marijuana use in the 
workplace by means of urine testing causes unique problems. The urine 
tests most frequently used to detect marijuana, the EMIT and Jther im-
munoassay tests, do not reveal the presence of the psychoactive ingredi-
ent of marijuana in an individual's urine. Rather, they examine the 
reactivity of three substances - a reagent, an indicator, and a THC me-
tabolite.30 The tests do not detect the presence of marijuana or any other 
drug. They monitor the reaction between chemicals found in one's urine 
and the chemical reagent provided in the tests. 31 One of the problems 
with the EMIT and other immunoassay tests is that various chemicals 
produced by the body may be confused with those present in mari-
juana.32 As a result of this "cross-reactivity," detection of marijuana by 
use of an immunoassay test such as the EMIT test is often inaccurate.33 
Because the amount of cross-reactivity varies with each individual, im-
munoassays are considered by some experts to be inconclusive of mari-
juana use. 34 
Other considerations when testing for marijuana use are "passive 
inhalation" and "false positives." Passive inhalation, the unintentional 
inhalation of marijuana smoke, may account for test results indicative of 
drug use. 35 False positives occur when a substance other than an illegal 
drug is responsible for test results that indicate drug use. 36 Moreover, 
least once, while only 28% of the respondents admitted to experimenting with co-
caine. Englade, supra note 1, at 22. 
30. See Comment, Detecting Marijuana Use, supra note 12, at 396-97. 
31. /d. 
32. /d. at 394. 
33. /d. at 394, 396-97. 
34. Id. at 394; Morgan, supra note 12, at 316. Indeed, some researchers have concluded 
that it is virtually impossible to standardize immunoassays and that "a single urine 
specimen can be positive by one immunoassay and negative by another." See Urine 
Testing, supra note 23, at 881. 
35. Comment, Detecting Marijuana Use, supra note 12, at 397. Whether a person tests 
positive for marijuana use after passive inhalation depends upon the calibration of 
the urinalysis used. Urine tests can be adjusted to detect greater or lesser amounts 
of the THC metabolite in a subject's urine. Consequently, some experts argue that 
the passive inhalation problem can be avoided if person's utilizing the tests calibrate 
the tests to detect greater amounts of the THC metabolite. Perez-Reyes, Di 
Guiseppi, and Davis, Passive Inhalation of Marijuana Smoke and Urinary Excretion 
of Cannabinoids, 249 J. A.M.A. 475 (1983). 
36. Because all immunoassay tests are based upon the reaction of the tests' reagents and 
various enzymes in an individual's urine, innaccurate results can be caused when 
enzymes other than those of an illegal substance react with a reagent. See generally 
Morgan, supra note 12, at 309-311; Detecting Marijuana Use, supra note 12, at 394-
96. There is some debate over what legal substances may cause drug tests to be 
inaccurate. See Morgan, supra note 12, at 309 (false positives may occur for un-
known reasons); Private Employee Urinalysis, supra note 16, at 1459, n.52; see also 
Englade, supra note 1, at 23 (therapeutic cold medications, schizophrenia medica-
tions, and antibiotics can all cause false positives). Some researchers believe that 
persons with dark skin are more likely to produce positive test results in a urine test 
because enzymes in their skin react in a manner similar to the THC metabolite 
found in marijuana. New York Times, May 3, 1986, at 1, co1.3. 
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the Syva Corporation has stated that six factors can affect the amount of 
THC, the psychoactive chemical in marijuana, that is excreted in urine.J7 
Syva's recognition of these factors suggests that the test is not sufficiently 
reliable to serve as a basis for adverse personnel action. 
III. CASE LAW CONCERNING THE RELIABILITY OF DRUG 
TESTING 
Challenges to drug testing programs initiated against municipal, 
state or federal governments are common. 38 By contrast, few suits have 
3 7. These factors are: 
1. THC has been shown to be metabolized (converted to metabo-
lites) more rapidly in chronic (frequent) users than in infrequent users. 
2. In controlled smoking studies, frequent users of marijuana often 
show initial levels (in blood as well as in urine) of THC metabolites that 
are greater than the highest levels obtained by relatively infrequent users. 
3. Absorption and distribution of THC throughout the body is dif-
ferent for each person. Thus, the rate of conversion to metabolites (and 
the subsequent excretion of these metabolites) of the THC that is stored in 
fatty tissue will vary for different individuals. It is not yet known whether 
factors such as body weight, stress, the menstrual cycle, diet or other phys-
ical or psychological influences can cause erratic increases and decreases 
in the excretion rate in any given individual. 
4. The method of administration (smoking or eating) does not ap-
pear to affect excretion of metabolites. 
5. The volume of urine differs throughout the day for any individ-
ual. When the total volume is greater, for instance as a result of drinking 
large quantities of liquid, the concentration of a given component can be-
come diluted. Thus, assuming· that the same amount of THC metabolites 
are present in the urine of two different individuals, the person with the 
greatest total volume of urine will exhibit an apparently lower concentra-
tion of metabolites. Conversely, if an individual has retained urine for an 
extended period of time, for instance, during sleep, the urine concentration 
of the various components may be higher in a sample taken from the first 
urination in the morning than a sample taken from a urination later in the 
day. This fact may also affect the apparent concentration ofTHC metabo-
lites in random urine collections over a 24-hour day. 
6. The kidney functions as one of the body's "filters." It removes 
waste from body fluids and deposits the waste in the urine for excretion. 
When the kidney's ability to filter is impaired (by disease, for instance), the 
wastes are not removed as promptly as they would be in healthy individu-
als .... [A]n individual may exhibit an erratic urinary excretion pattern of 
a given waste product such as THC metabolites, for example. (citations 
omitted). 
Comment, Private Employee Urinalysis, supra note 16, at 1458, n.44. 
38. See McDonell v. Hunter, 746 F.2d 785 (8th Cir. 1984)(employees of Iowa Depart-
ment of Corrections were granted a preliminary injunction that prohibited strip 
searches, blood tests, and urinalysis of correctional officers as a condition of their 
employment); Banks v. Federal Aviation Admin., 687 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1982) (dis-
charge of air traffic controllers on the result of a voluntary urine test, where urine 
samples had been destroyed following initial testing, was improper); Division 241 
Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir. 1976) (urine and 
blood tests of municipal bus drivers, following serious accidents or when suspected 
of alcohol or drug abuse, performed in hospital held proper); Jones v. McKenzie, 
628 F. Supp. 1500 (D. D.C. 1986) (discharge of school bus attendant on the basis of 
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been instituted against private employers. 39 As a rule, actions brought 
against public employers are brought on constitutional grounds such as 
the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures or the right of 
privacy.40 Although an analysis of the constitutional arguments is not 
single unconfirmed EMIT test was arbitrary and capricious); National Treasury 
Employees Union v. Rabb, 649 F. Supp. 380 (E.D. La. 1986) (Customs Service drug 
testing plan requiring that all employees seeking promotion to certain positions sub-
mit to "close" observation during urine collection violates legitimate expectations of 
privacy, and absent reasonable suspicion, violates the fourth amendment); Lovvorn 
v. Chattanooga, 647 F. Supp. 875 (E.D. Tenn. 1986) (city may not, consistent with 
the fourth amendment, subject firefighters to drug testing without reasonable cause 
to believe firefighter had used drugs); Capua v. Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507 
(D. N.J. 1986) (drug testing of city's firefighters, absent reasonable suspicion of drug 
use, is impermissible); Pella v. Adams, 638 F. Supp. 94 (D. Nev. 1986) (issues of 
material fact raised concerning the reliability of the EMIT test preclude summary 
judgment for prison officials who use the test as a basis for disciplinary action); 
Everett v. Napper, 632 F. Supp. 1481 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (former city firefighter's 
termination for refusal to participate in drug testing upheld because testing was not 
a "search" under the fourth amendment); Shoemaker v. Handel, 619 F. Supp. 1089 
(D. N.J. 1985) (urinalysis and breathalyzer of jockeys pursuant to State Racing 
Commission regulations upheld); Higgs v. Wilson, 616 F. Supp. 226 (W.D. Ky. 
1985) (preliminary injunction granted against prison from disciplining inmates 
solely on the basis of unconfirmed EMIT tests); Wykoffv. Resig, 613 F. Supp. 1504 
(N.D. Ind. 1985) (EMIT test results, if confirmed by another type of urine test, can 
be used in prison disciplinary proceedings); Peranzo v. Coughlin, 608 F. Supp. 1504 
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (drug testing of inmates not enjoined); Allen v. Marietta, 601 F. 
Supp. 482 (N.D. Ga. 1985) (uring testing of government employees engaged in ex-
tremely hazardous work is not an unreasOnable search under the fourth amend-
ment); Storms v. Coughlin, 600 F. Supp. 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (random drug 
testing of inmates on a daily basis is constitutional if conducted in a reasonable 
manner); Jensen v. Lick, 589 F. Supp. 35 (D.N.D. 1984) (prison officials could im-
pose sanctions on prisoners based upon unconfirmed EMIT tests); Patchogue-Med-
ford Congress of Teachers v. Board of Educ., 119 A.D.2d 35, 505 N.Y.S.2d 888 
(1986) (teachers cannot be required as a condition of tenure to submit to urine test-
ing without reasonable cause); Caruso v. Ward, 133 Misc. 2d 544, 506 N.Y.S.2d 789 
(1986) (order requiring police department personnel serving in the organized crime 
control bureau to consent and submit to random drug testing was unconstitutional 
and permanently enjoined); Turner v. Fraternal Order of Police, 500 A.2d 1005 
(D.C. 1985) (order regarding drug testing of police upon reasonable suspicion up-
held); Palm Bay v. Bauman, 475 So. 2d 1322 (Fla. App. 1985) (if city has reason-
able suspicion, it may require urinalysis of police and firefighters); Smith v. State, 
250 Ga. 438, 298 S.E.2d 482 (1983) (EMIT test is sufficiently reliable to stand as the 
only evidence in a parole revocation hearing); Kane v. Fair, 33 Cr. L. 2492 (Mass. 
Superior Ct., August 5, 1983) (state failed to show that knowledgeable scientists 
would accept an unsubstantiated EMIT positive result as evidence of drug use and 
required the positive result be accompanied by an alternative method of testing). 
39. Cohen, Labor Law's New Specialty: Drug Testing, THE AMERICAN LAWYER, at 10 
(March 1986) (most decisions involving private sector drug screening have occurred 
at the state court level or have been subject to arbitration). See also Susser, "Legal 
Issues Raised by Drugs in the Workplace," LABOR LAW J. 42, 45-50. In Associa-
tion of Western Pulp v. Boise Cascade, 644 F. Supp. 183 (D. Or. 1986), the district 
court held that the employer's drug testing program did not violate workers' privacy 
rights, federal law, or state law as asserted by the employer's union. 
40. See, e.g., Lovvorn v. Chattanooga, 647 F. Supp. 875 (E.D. Tenn. 1986) (firefighters 
successfully challenged the city's drug testing plan on the grounds that it violated 
their fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures by 
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appropriate to suits against private employers,41 an examination of how 
courts have analyzed the reliability of drug tests is of relevance to both 
private and public challenges to drug testing programs. 
In Pella v. Adams,42 the United States District Court for the District 
of Nevada discussed the reliability of urinalysis testing as evidence of 
drug use.43 In Pella, a state prisoner challenged the competence of the 
technician performing the urinalysis as well as the use of positive EMIT 
test results in a disciplinary proceeding against him. 44 The Pella court 
noted the varying conclusions on the reliability of the EMIT test reached 
in prior cases brought against governmental agencies.45 The court there-
fore refused to grant summary judgment for the defendants because there 
was a "substantial issue of material fact" as to the accuracy and reliabil-
ity of the tests.46 
In Jones v. McKensie,41 the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia refused to approve the firing of a school bus attendant 
on the basis of a single, unconfirmed positive urinalysis test.48 After ex-
amining the nature of the EMIT test in relation to marijuana detection, 
as well as to the recommendations of the Syva Corporation, the court 
found that termination of the plaintiff's employment based on one drug 
test was arbitrary and capricious.49 Specifically, the Jones court held that 
an unconfirmed EMIT test is not sufficient proof that the plaintiff was 
under the influence of marijuana while at work. 50 
In Wykoffv. Resig,51 a prisoner brought an action against the Indi-
ana Department of Corrections, claiming that his constitutional rights 
the government); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Rabb, 649 F. Supp. 
380 (E.D. La. 1986) (Customers Service drug testing plan infringes legitimate ex-
pectations of privacy of governmental employees). 
41. See Stevens v. MorrisOn-Knudsen Saudi Arabian Consortium, 576 F. Supp. 516 (D. 
Md. 1983) (employer's acts of searching employees lockers for drugs did not 
amount to "state action" and therefore the employees could not raise protections of 
federal constitution); see also Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982) (acts of private 
individuals are beyond the scope of "state action" and thus beyond the protections 
of the federal constitution unless the State has exercised coercive power, making the 
act that of the State). 
42. 638 F. Supp. 94 (D. Nev. 1986). 
43. /d. at 97. 
44. /d. at 95. 
45. /d. at 97. 
46. Summary judgment was granted for defendants as to Pella's fourth amendment 
claims and Pella's claims for damages, yet summary judgment was denied as to 
Pella's due process claims arising from his challenges to the testing program initi-
ated by the defendants. /d. at 99. 
47. Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F. Supp. 1500 (D.D.C. 1986). 
48. /d. at 1500. 
49. The court relied on, inter alia, a report by the Food and Drug Administration, a 
letter published by three toxicologists in the Journal of the American Medical Asso-
ciation, and a scientific advisory written by the United States Center for Disease 
Control. /d. at 1505-07. 
50. /d. at 1506. 
51. Wykoff v. Resig, 613 F. Supp. 1504 (N.D. Ind. 1985). 
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were violated because he was subjected to disciplinary proceedings on the 
basis of a single EMIT test. The United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Indiana examined past decisions that had addressed 
the reliability of drug tests and found that there was considerable debate 
about the reliability of unconfirmed EMIT test results. 52 The court 
stated that "considering this case in light of all the aforementioned cases, 
this court would normally face a very difficult and delicate question as to 
the constitutionality of sanctions imposed upon prisoners based upon un-
confirmed single EMIT tests."53 However, because the prisoner's initial 
EMIT test had been confirmed four months later by an alternative 
method of urinalysis, the court upheld the use of the EMIT test result 
against the prisoner. 54 
In Storms v. Coughlin, 55 prisoners challenged a random EMIT test-
ing program employed by a New York state prison. 56 The plaintiffs in 
Storms questioned both the reliability of the tests and the manner in 
which they were performed. 57 The United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York determined that the issue of the test's 
reliability, although not providing a basis for a preliminary injunction to 
enjoin the testing, raised an issue of substance that was sufficient to over-
come a motion to dismiss. 58 The court reached the same result under 
similar facts a year later in Peranzo v. Coughlin. 59 
IV. THE PRIVACY ISSUE 
The reliability of drug tests is not the only policy issue relevant to 
private sector drug testing. Privacy, or more precisely the invasion of 
privacy, is an issue relevant to drug testing in both the public and private 
sectors. The fourth amendment right to privacy does not apply to the 
private sector, 60 but certain tort causes of action involving violation of 
individual privacy rights safeguard the same privacy concerns. 
52. /d. at 1508-12. 
53. /d. at 1512. 
54. /d. The court held that: 
/d. 
the TLC (thin-layer chromatography) method of confirming an EMIT test 
is sufficient. Even though Gas Chromatography or Gas Chromatography/ 
Mass Spectrometry might be the best methods with which to confirm an 
EMIT test, plaintiff has not shown that the TLC method of confirming 
positive EMIT results is inadequate or unreliable. . . . However, in order 
to afford a prisoner appropriate due process in accordance with Wolff v. 
McDonnell, [418 U.S. 539 (1974)], this court holds that all positive EMIT 
results in the future should be confirmed by a second EMIT test or its 
equivalent." 
55. 600 F. Supp. 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). 
56. Id. at 1216. 
57. /d. at 1221. 
58. /d. at 1222. 
59. 608 F. Supp. 1504 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
60. See supra note 41. 
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A. The Invasion of Privacy Generally 
The common law right to privacy was first recognized in the late 
nineteenth century.61 It was not until much later, however, that a cause 
of action for tortious invasion of privacy became an effective means of 
preserving an individual's rights.62 Some type of right to privacy, statu-
tory or common law, is recognized in almost every state. 6 3 A few states 
have specific constitutional provisions that provide for a right to pri-
vacy64 or have general provisions that have been interpreted to protect 
citizens from unwarranted intrusions into their personal privacy.65 
Dean Prosser divides the right to privacy into four distinct catego-
ries, the most important of which is "intrusion upon seclusion."66 Pros-
ser states that "[o]ne who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, 
upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or con-
cerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the 
intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person."67 The Re-
statement (Second) of Torts also states that an unreasonable intrusion 
may be actionable. 68 These authorities suggest, therefore, that there is a 
common law right to privacy, separate and apart from the constitutional 
right to privacy that protects individuals from unreasonable searches by 
the state. 
Privacy actions brought against employers by employees reflect the 
variety of types of intrusions courts will recognize as tortious. In Bratt v. 
International Business Machines, 69 the First Circuit developed a balanc-
ing test to determine whether an invasion of privacy had in fact occurred. 
The court stated that "[t]he test for a violation of privacy is whether the 
substantiality of the intrusion on the employee's privacy ... outweighs 
the employer's legitimate business interest in obtaining . . . the informa-
tion. The personal nature of the information is one factor to be consid-
61. Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). Dean 
Prosser notes that this article "has come to be regarded as the outstanding example 
of the influence of legal periodicals upon the American law." Prosser, Privacy, 48 
CALIF. L. REv. 383 (1960). 
62. Prosser, supra note 61, at 384-88. 
63. Prosser & Keeton, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS§ 117 (5th ed. 
1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON). 
64. Article I, section 1 of the California Constitution provides: "All people are by na-
ture free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying 
and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and 
pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
65. See. e.g., State v. Glass, 583 P.2d 872, reh. denied 596 P.2d 10 (Alaska 1978); State 
v. Mueller, 66 Haw. 616, 673 P.2d 1351 (1983); People v. McCarthy, 86 Ill. App. 
3d., 407 N.E.2d 971 (1980); Suenram v. Society of Valley Hosps., 155 N.J. Super. 
593, 383 A.2d 143 (1977); Snider v. Shapp, 45 Pa Commw. 337, 405 A.2d 602 
(1979); State v. Adler, 16 Wash. App. 459, 558 P.2d 817 (1976). 
66. Prosser, supra note 61, at 389. 
67. !d. 
68. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 652B (1977). 
69. 785 F.2d 352 (1st Cir. 1986). 
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ered in determining the substantiality of the intrusion. "70 
In Bratt, the employee alleged that IBM had violated his right to 
privacy by allowing an independent physician, hired by IBM, to discuss 
his medical problems with IBM management without his permission. 71 
Although the court granted summary judgment for the defendants on 
one of the plaintiff's privacy claims, 72 it held that other violations of his 
privacy by IBM may have occurred. The court noted that the existence 
of IBM regulations governing the confidentiality of medical records en-
hances the employee's expectation of privacy, and "[t]he substantiality of 
an invasion of privacy is thereby increased where a company violates [its 
own] internal regulations."73 The Bratt decision suggests that an em-
ployee's right to privacy is likely to be violated when both common law 
tort principles of privacy and company regulations regarding worker's 
rights to privacy are violated. 
In Phillips v. Smalley Maintenance Services, Jnc., 14 a former em-
ployee brought federal claims under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in addi-
tion to a pendant state law claim that asserted tortious invasion of 
privacy for sexual harrassment. 75 The Eleventh Circuit presented certi-
fied questions as to Alabama's recognition and treatment of the tort of 
invasion of privacy to the Supreme Court of Alabama. 76 In its answer, 
the Supreme Court of Alabama recognized the right to privacy as defined 
by the Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 652B. 77 The court placed 
weight on Comment (b) of section 652B, which states in part: "The in-
trusion itself makes the defendant subject to liability, even though there 
is no publication .... " 78 The court interpreted section 652B to mean 
that a cause of action for invasion of privacy will lie regardless of 
whether there is an action for defamation. 79 
In O'Brien v. Papa Gino's of America, Inc., 80 the First Circuit up-
held damages for an employee who was discharged after submitting to a 
polygraph test. 81 The employee claimed tortious invasion of privacy in 
70. /d. at 360. 
71. Id at 357-58. 
72. /d. at 361. 
73. /d. at 360-61. 
74. 711 F.2d 1524 (11th Cir. 1983). 
75. /d. at 1526. 
76. /d. at 1532-37. 
77. The Supreme Court of Alabama, in its answer to the Eleventh Circuit's first certified 
question, expressly recognized § 652B of the Restatement (Second) of Torts as Ala-
bama's definition of the right to privacy. In reaching this conclusion, the court 
relied heavily upon Norris v. Moskin Stores, Inc., 272 Ala. 179, 132 So.2d 321 
(1961), which adopted Prosser's analysis of the right to privacy. Compare Prosser, 
Law of Torts, pp. 637-39 (2d. ed. 1955) with Restatement (Second) of Torts§ 652B 
(1977). Prosser's analysis of the right to privacy is similar to the analysis contained 
in the Restatement. 
78. /d. at 1535. 
79. /d. at 1534-35. 
80. 780 F.2d 1067 (lst Cir. 1986). 
81. /d. at 1068. 
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addition to wrongful discharge and defamation. 82 As to the privacy is-
sue, the court upheld the jury's award of damages83 as well as the jury's 
finding that "the particular investigation conducted was 'highly offensive' 
and invasive of the employee's privacy."84 The court gave no credence to 
the employer's claim that the plaintiff had contracted away his right to 
privacy with regard to his use of drugs. 85 The court stated: 
Because the company personnel manual forbids drug use by· 
employees, the appellant [Papa Gino's] reasons that O'Brien 
impliedly gave permission in his employment contract for the 
company to make whatever investigations it deemed necessary, 
including the polygraph examination. Even if we were to read 
O'Brien's agreement with Papa Gino's so broadly as to give im-
plied permission for polygraph examinations generally, it 
would not negate the jury's finding that the particular investi-
gation conducted was "highly offensive" and invasive of plain-
tiff's privacy. Such a finding of egregious offensiveness in the 
particular case would indicate that the defendant's conduct ex-
ceeded the scope of any consent O'Brien had arguably given by 
accepting employment at Papa Gino's. 86 · 
A jury finding of offensive behavior on the part of an employer who re-
quires a urinalysis as part of an investigation would negate assertions by 
the employer that the employee had waived all privacy rights by signing 
an employment contract and submitting to drug testing as a condition of 
his or her continued employment. 
B. Invasion of Privacy and Drug Testing in Private Employment 
In Luck v. Southern Pacific Transport Co., 87 an employee brought an 
action against her former employer on the grounds of invasion of pri-
vacy. 88 The plaintiff in Luck, a computer programmer, refused to submit 
a urine sample for the purposes of drug testing and subsequently was 
dismissed by her employer. 89 The plaintiff in Luck contends that an em-
ployer must reasonably suspect that an employee has engaged in drug use 
before it has any right to require drug testing.90 In essence, Luck chal-
lenges the right of a private employer to use random drug testing. By 
applying the holdings indicated above as an analytical framework, it ap-
82. /d. at 1071. 
83. /d. at 1076-77. 
84. /d. at 1072. 
85. /d. 
86. /d. 
87. Cal. Super. Ct. for San Francisco Co., Docket No. C84-3-230. (The Luck case is 
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pears that the plaintiff in Luck states a cognizable invasion of privacy 
claim. 
Whether the plaintiff in Luck or plaintiffs in similar cases will pre-
vail depends on whether the intrusion is justified under an analysis such 
as the Bratt balancing test, where the substantiality of the intrusion upon 
the employee's privacy is balanced against the employer's business inter-
ests.91 Unless an employer can demonstrate a legitimate business interest 
that outweighs the intrusion upon an employee's privacy necessitated by 
drug testing, an employee such as that in Luck may be able to recover for 
tortious invasion of privacy. 
V. DEFAMATION 
Another cause of action that exists against private employers for 
drug testing is defamation, which consists of the twin torts of libel and 
slander.92 Prosser defines defamation as an invasion of an individual's 
interest in his or her name and reputation.93 In order to recover for defa-
mation in the drug testing context, an employee must show that the em-
ployer made false statements concerning the results of the employee's 
drug test to another and that the employee's reputation was damaged as 
a result. Unlike privacy actions, the drug testing itself is not the sole 
issue; rather it is the employer's communication to third persons about 
the results of an employee's drug test that creates liability. 
In Houston Belt and Terminal Railway v. Wherry,94 the Court of 
Civil Appeals of Texas upheld an award of damages in a libel suit 
brought by an employee against his employer.95 The employee sustained 
a knee injury while at work and subsequently fainted.96 Pursuant to 
company policy, he was then examined by the railroad's chief surgeon,97 
who administered a drug test to determine if the fainting had been caused 
by drug use. 98 The .test result showed traces of methadone, a drug com-
monly used by heroin addicts. 99 The surgeon reported his findings to 
management-level personnel of the railroad and, based on his findings, 
the company issued reports to officers of the railroad and to federal labor 
officials indicating that the employee was a drug-user. 100 The employee 
91. Bratt v. International Business Mach., Inc., 785 F.2d 352, 360 (1st Cir. 1986). 
92. Prosser & Keeton, supra note 63, at 771-72. 
93. /d. 
94. 548 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. 1977). 
95. /d. at 753-55. 
96. /d. at 746. 
97. /d. 
98. /d. 
99. The type of drug test used is not stated in the case. The chief surgeon for the com-
pany stated that although traces of methadone were found, the trace was a minute 
amount and that one test was not enough to determine that the employee used 
methadone. /d. 
100. The doctor reported that the test did not determine conclusively that the employee 
was a drug user. Thereafter, the doctor supplied a written report to the manage-
ment that he had intended to indicate "only the possibility that Wherry was a her-
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was suspended and eventually discharged for being an unsafe employee 
despite the fact that later tests revealed that no methadone or other drugs 
were present in his system. 101 The employee appealed his discharge and 
then brought suit against the railroad and certain company employees 
who had stated that he used narcotics. 102 
The court sustained the trial court's verdict for the employee with 
respect to the railroad company. 103 The court found that the essential 
elements of defamation were present: "We think the jury was entitled to 
conclude from the evidence that [officials of the railway] made false state-
ments in writing that [the employee] was a narcotics user when they 
knew better." 104 The court also found that the second urinalysis, which 
showed no trace of methadone, verified the inaccuracy of the reports is-
sued by the railroad. 105 The appellate court upheld the jury's verdict of 
punitive and compensatory damages for injuries sutfered. 106 
O'Brien v. Papa Gino's of America, Inc. 107 dealt with defamation in 
addition to invasion of privacy. 108 The employee in O'Brien was termi-
nated from his employment for allegedly failing a polygraph test. 109 The 
employee claimed he had been defamed because the company had com-
municated to its employees that he was terminated because he was a 
drug-user. 110 The employer claimed that such communications from an 
employer to its employees are privileged and, as such, do not constitute 
publication. 111 The district court found that no privilege existed between 
the employer and its employees and the First Circuit affirmed. 112 
The statement at issue in O'Brien was "O'Brien was terminated for 
drug [cocaine] use." 113 Although the jury found that the statement was 
substantially true, it found that there were retaliatory motives for the 
employee's discharge and that the failure to explain such motives in 
statements to company employees was a purposeful misrepresentation 
oin or methadone user, not that he was a user." Id. The company then issued 
reports to company officials that Wherry tested positive for drugs, despite the quali-
fications in the doctor's report. Id. 
101. Id. at 746-47. 
102. Id. at 747. 
103. The jury verdict against two individual defendants was overturned. Id. at 755. 
104. Id. at 752. 
105. The company received the results of this second urine test two weeks before they 
dismissed the employee. !d. at 748. 
106. Compensatory damages were awarded for loss of employment, injury to reputation 
and mental suffering. Id. at 753. The court found that there was actual malice, and 
under Texas civil law, awarded exemplary (punitive) damages. Id. at 753-55. 
107. 780 F.2d 1067 (1st Cir. 1986). 
108. Id. at 1071. 
109. Id. 
110. The statement at issue was "O'Brien was terminated for drug [cocaine] use." Id. at 
1073. 
Ill. Id. 
112. Id. at 1074. 
113. Id. at 1073. 
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that was defamatory. 114 O'Brien suggests that statements made by an 
employer concerning an employee need not be entirely false for an action 
in defamation to be allowed. Any communication about an employee 
that does not fully state the truth about an employee is defamatory. 
VI. WRONGFUL DISCHARGE 
A third possible cause of action for employees of private companies 
is wrongful discharge. This action is an exception to the general rule that 
an employment contract may be terminated legally at any time for any 
reason. 115 The common law rule is that an employment contract of in-
definite duration, a so-called "at will" contract, can be terminated legally 
by either party at any time. Most states, however, have adopted statutes 
that provide exceptions to this common law doctrine116 that limit an em-
ployer's ability to terminate an employee for any cause. 117 
As an exception to the common law "at will" doctrine, the action of 
wrongful discharge has been dealt with differently by courts. Some 
courts simply have refused to recognize a cause of action for wrongful 
discharge. 118 Other courts have acknowledged an exception to the "at 
will" doctrine, but have declined to classify the exception as wrongful 
discharge. 119 Still other courts recognize wrongful discharge as an ac-
ceptable cause of action in either contract or tort. 120 The majority of 
courts that recognize a wrongful discharge cause of action treat it as a 
tort action. 121 
In Maryland, the court of appeals has recognized that a cause of 
action for an employer's wrongful discharge of an at will employee exists 
in proper circumstances.I22 Such an action will be recognized only 
114. Id. at 1074. 
115. Moniodis v. Cook, 64 Md. App. 1, 10, 494 A.2d 212, 216, cert. denied, 304 Md. 631, 
500 A.2d 649 (1985). 
116. Adler v. American Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31, 35, 432 A.2d 464, 467 (1981). 
117. Id. 
118. Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, Missouri and North Carolina do not recog-
nize wrongful discharge. See Bender Ship Repair, Inc. v. Stevens, 379 So. 2d 594 
(Ala. 1980); Segal v. Arrow Industries Corp., 364 So. 2d 89 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1978); Georgia Power Co. v. Busbin, 242 Ga. 612, 250 S.E.2d 442 (1978); Kelly v. 
Mississippi Valley Gas Co., 397 So. 2d 874 (Miss. 1981); Christy v. Petrus, 365 Mo. 
1187, 295 S.W.2d 122 (1956); Dockery v. Lampart Table Co., 36 N.C. App. 293, 
244 S.E.2d 272 (1978). 
119. Colorado, Idaho, Kentucky, Montana, Vermont, and Wisconsin have not recog-
nized a cause of action for wrongful discharge on the facts of the cases before them, 
but these jurisdictions have indicated a willingness to adopt such an exception to the 
at will doctrine in proper circumstances. See Lampe v. Presbyterian Med. Center, 
41 Colo. App. 465, 590 P.2d 513 (1978); Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation Dist., 98 
Idaho 330, 563 P.2d 54 (1977); Scroghan v. Kraftco Corp., 551 S.W.2d 811 (Ky. 
1977); Keneally v. Orgain, 606 P.2d 127 (Mont. 1980); Jones v. Keogh, 137 Vt. 562, 
409 A.2d 581 (1979); Ward v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 95 Wis. 2d 372, 290 N.W.2d 536 
(Wis. Ct. App. 1980). 
120. Adler, at 36, 432 A.2d at 467. 
121. Id. at 37, 432 A.2d at 468. 
122. See Adler v. American Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31, 432 A.2d 464 (1981) (answer-
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where the motivation for the discharge contravenes some clear mandate 
of public policy, which is most often expressed statutorily .123 The court 
of appeals also has noted that the at will doctrine can be modified judi-
cially in response to changing circumstances in employment law. 124 
Maryland's statute regarding polygraph examinations provides a 
model of the type of law that would support a wrongful discharge cause 
of action. 125 In Moniodis v. Cook, 126 an employee was subjected to a 
polygraph examination by her employer because of missing inventory at 
the employer's store. 127 The court allowed recovery against her em-
ployer on the grounds of wrongful or constructive discharge noting that 
the employer, Rite-Aid, violated a clear statutory mandate against the 
use of polygraph tests.12s 
Consequently, a claim for wrongful discharge will rarely be upheld 
unless some statutory basis can be found to support the employee's 
claim. Currently only San Francisco has enacted a city ordinance 
prohibiting drug testing in the workplace. 129 Bills similar to the San 
ing certified questions of law from the United States District Court for the District 
of Maryland, the Court of Appeals of Maryland ruled that a cause of action for 
abusive discharge does exist in Maryland). 
123. /d. at 47, 432 A.2d at 471. 
124. /d. at 42-43, 432 A.2d at 471. 
125. The statute forbids any employer to require an employee or prospective employee to 
take a polygraph examination as a condition of employment or of continued em-
ployment. Mo. ANN. CODE art. 100, § 95 (1983 Repl. Vol.). 
126. 64 Md. App. 1, 494 A.2d 212, cert. denied, 304 Md. 631, 500 A.2d 649 (1985). 
127. /d. at 6, 494 A.2d at 214. 
128. /d. at 10, 494 A.2d at 216-17. Constructive discharge occurs when an "employer 
has deliberately caused or allowed an employee's workirig conditions to become so 
intolerable that a reasonable person in the employee's place would have felt so com-
pelled to resign." /d. at 11,494 A.2d 217, (citing Beye v. Bureau ofNat'l Affairs, 59 
Md. App. 642, 653, 477 A.2d 1197, 1203, cert. denied, 301 Md. 639, 484 A.2d 274 
. (1984)). 
129. The amendment provides, in part: 
Sec. 3300A.1 POLICY. It is the public policy of the City and County of 
San Francisco that all citizens enjoy the full benefit of the right to privacy 
in the workplace guaranteed to them by Article 1, Section 1 of the Califor-
nia Constitution. It is the purpose of this Article to protect employees 
against unreasonable inquiry and investigation into off-the-job conduct, as-
sociations, and activities not directly related to the actual performance of 
job responsibilities. 
Sec. 330A.5 EMPLOYER PROHIBITED FROM TESTING OF 
EMPLOYEES. 
No employer may demand, require, or request employees to submit to, to 
take or to undergo any blood, urine, or encephalographic test in the body 
as a condition of continued employment. Nothing herein shall prohibit an 
employer from requiring a specific employee to submit to blood or urine 
testing if: 
(a) the employer has reasonable grounds to believe that an employee's 
faculties are impaired on the job; and 
(b) the employee is in a position where such impairment presents a clear 
and present danger to the physical safety of the employee, another em-
ployee or to a member of the public; and 
(c) the employer provides the employee, at the employer's expense, the 
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Francisco ordinance have been proposed in Michigan, Maine, and Mary-
land130 but have had little support. 131 Some state constitutions grant pri-
vate individuals protection from intrusions into their privacy. 132 
Presumably in these states a wrongful discharge action would lie for in-
trusion of privacy because of the constitutional proscription. 
Although a wrongful discharge cause of action may be difficult to 
prove without the requisite statutory support, courts have granted em-
ployees damages for lost wages arising from improper dismissal. For ex-
ample, in Love v. Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co., 133 the 
plaintiff was awarded damages for his lost wages that arose incident to 
his claim for invasion of privacy.l34 Likewise, in O'Brien the court 
granted the discharged employee damages representing lost wages. 135 
Although damages for lost wages differ from punitive damages that are 
granted for wrongful discharge, an employee can recover for his or her 
dismissal if the employee is found to have violated the employee's rights. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Drug testing is becoming more and more popular in the American 
workplace. Presidential declarations and an increase in the public's 
awareness of the dangers of drug abuse have led to greater employer con-
cern about drug abuse. Although certain of employers' justifications for 
drug testing are laudable, such as safety in th~ workplace and assistance 
for chemically dependent employees, privacy concerns and the lack of 
reliable tests caution against the use of drug testing by private employers. 
opportunity to have the sample tested or evaluated by [a] State licensed 
independent laboratory/testing facility and provides the employee with a 
reasonable opportunity to rebut or explain the results. 
SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., POLICY CODE ch. 8, art. 33A(1985). 
Additionally the amendment states that in conducting those tests designed to 
identify the presence of chemical substances in the body, the employer shall ensure 
to the extent feasible that the test only measure, and that its records only show or 
make use of, information regarding chemical substances in the body which are likely 
to affect the employee's ability to safely perform his or her duties while on the job. 
/d. 
130. Baltimore Sun, April 8, 1986, at 21A, col.2. 
131. The Maryland bill, introduced by Delgate Nathaniel McFadden, would not have 
prevented drug testing but would have limited disciplinary actions that could be 
taken by employers on the basis of the tests' results. The bill died in the House 
Economic Matters Committee in mid-March of 1986. Baltimore Sun, March 17, 
1986, at SA, col. I. 
132. See White v. Davis, 13 Cal.3d 757, 533 P.2d 222, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1975) (police 
practice of enrolling officers as students in major university to conduct covert sur-
veillance of students and teachers was a prima facie violation of plaintiff's explicit 
right to privacy under the right to privacy amendment of the California Constitu-
tion); and State v. Helfrich, 183 Mont. 484, 600 P.2d 816 (1979) (sample of mari-
juana obtained by private party from defendant's garden by means of a trespass is an 
illegal invasion of defendant's constitutional right of privacy.). 
133. 263 So. 2d 460, cert. denied, 262 La. 1117, 266 So. 2d 429 (1972). 
134. 263 So. 2d at 467. 
135. 780 F.2d at 1076. 
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Moreover, when such tests are administered by a private employer, the 
employee may have a remedy in various common law causes of action. 
Private employers should utilize drug testing only when they have 
some basis to suspect that an employee is using drugs. In these situa-
tions, the preliminary EMIT test should be confirmed by GC/MS test 
conducted under stringent laboratory conditions to ensure that the 
EMIT tests results are not erroneous. This limited and careful use of 
drug testing strikes the proper balance between the employer's rights to 
ensure safety and efficiency in the workplace and the employee's rights 
not to be subjected to unwarranted and inaccurate drug testing. 
Dean S. Landis 
